In addition to complex multilateral trade agreements, the U.S. has pursued simpler bilateral agreements, which were expected to be less politically sensitive and therefore gain congressional approval, especially if the TPA had not been renewed. On September 28, 2001, for example, President Bush signed the Law Implementing the Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Jordan (P.L. 107-43). Bilateral free trade agreements with Singapore and Chile were followed with the expectation of similar support. 3. (back) A detailed summary of this trade policy-focused process is available in CRS 97-56, Chilean Trade and Economic Reform: Implications for NAFTA Accession, by. 17 October 1997. pp. 1-9. Important provisions.
Chapter 14 of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement creates separate categories of entry for citizens of each country to temporarily engage in a wide range of business and investment activities, i.e., non-immigrants. If a trade dispute is not resolved, the country is eventually faced with the possibility of suspending benefits under the free trade agreement of “equivalent effect” (Article 22.15(2)), resulting in an increase in customs duties or the payment of an estimated monetary amount of 50% of what one panel calls an “equivalent effect”. This Article shall not apply to the work in question. The difference lies in the fact that the option of non-payment of a labour dispute is a monetary valuation that would be limited to $US 15 million per year, with recourse to an equivalent dollar value of the suspended benefits (higher customs duties) if the monetary tax is not paid. The monetary investment would also go to a fund and spent on “appropriate work initiatives.” Labour supporters argue that limiting the valuation to $15 million and paying the appraise into a fund in the offending country do not effect the working rules. . . .